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Central to any regulatory program designed to manage the disposal of hazardous wastes is the development of a system for defining and distinguishing hazardous wastes from the plethora of non-hazardous wastes. Such a system involves both defining the concept of waste in general and distinguishing that subset of wastes considered "hazardous" and thus requiring special control. This process would seem to be straightforward, involving the appropriate scientific expertise to identify which wastes are potentially harmful to health or the environment, and listing and classifying them in some logical way.
Economic efAciency arguments would suggest that this process would include developing a "degree of hazard" system, i.e., identifying those wastes which are most hazardous, less hazardous, etc., so that resources could be efficiently allocated to control the most hazardous wastes more stringently, and so on.
In reality, this process has not been straightforward at all. In the variety of industrialized countries that have attempted to deal with the problem, attempts to define and classify hazardous wastes have been characterized by: lack of information; scientific uncertainty; differences in legal versus administrative or scientific definitions; trade-offs between comprehensiveness, precision, and implementability; consideration of environmental protection and cost to industry; problems in standardization and the need for flexibility; and finally wide differences in the political cultures that affect responses to all of these difficulties. As a result, definition and classification schemes vary significantly between countries and even between states or regions within countries. and are designed to meet different administrative purposes and institutional constraints. Although there has been strong pressure towards international harmonization, coordinating bodies have tried but failed to develop an internationally accepted system. In the report of a recent North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) study of hazardous waste management, Dr. Bernd Wolbeck, one of the Federal Republic of Germany's leading hazardous waste experts has remarked: "During the past ten years, the political and regulatory discussion has intensively focused on the questions of what constitutes a hazardous waste. Despite these efforts, an international consensus could not be achieved on the issue. One of the primary reasons for this seems to me that the question has often been posed without indicating clearly enough the legal requirements which the definition and classification were to satisfy." [l] British hazardous waste expert Ted Finnecy has observed that, in addition to legal requirements, hazardous waste classification schemes depend upon a complex structure of regulatory and administrative purposes that may vary significantly between countries.
[2] Understanding how these variations arose and how explicit or implicit criteria for listing and classifying wastes were chosen reveals much about the interaction between institutional constraints and science in developing environmental control regulations in general.
To examine some of these issues we will first outline the various types OF classiflcation systems that can be employed. We will then turn to case studies of how hazardous waste classification systems were developed in two key countries, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) . The U.S. and the FXG were two of the first countries to develop hazardous waste control systems. Within Europe, the FRG has served as a model for other countries, and in the U.S., the system developed by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has been imposed as a model for the control systems in the various states. In addition, we will briefly compare them with the classification scheme of Austria that has been influenced by the FRG. Finally, we will discuss some of the key issues illustrated by these cases and their significance in terms of the general implementation problems of such control legislation.
TYPES OF HAZARDOUS WASJX CLASSIFICATION SYSEMS
Before examining the classifications systems adopted by specific countries it is useful to outline the various kinds of classification systems that can be used to regulate hazardous waste. One can define hazardous waste by: general characteristics, the presence of hazardous constituents, and determining that specific wastes are hazardous and listing them. [3] 
Hazardous Waste Characteristics
In this approach, general hazardous waste characteristics, such as flammability, corrosivity, toxicity, etc., are defined. Specific test procedures are given to determine if a waste meets the criteria. For example, with regard to Aammability a threshold flash point temperature is given, above which a waste is considered hazardous.
Hazardous Constituents
In this approach the presence of specific toxic chemical constituents, possibly above a certain concentration, define a waste as hazardous. Wastes must be tested for the presence of such constituents.
Hazardous Waste Lists
The most common approach to waste classification is the listing of specific wastes identified as hazardous, the so-called inclusive list. No testing is required. If the waste is on the list it is automatically regulated. Several types of inclusive lists can be used.
a
Lists of "generic" hazardous wastes, that is wastes arising in many different industries or from many sources. Examples are "waste lubricating oils" and "halogenated organic solvents"; Lists of industry specific wastes, such as pickling liquor from steel manufacturing"; Lists of specific chemical products, which if discarded, are to be considered hazardous, such as DDT or chlordane.
Another approach, previously used by the United Kingdom in its initial hazardous waste regulations is the exclusive list. An exclusive list describes wastes that are not hazardous and therefore not regulated. (For a further discussion of exclusive lists see in this volume Ley. p.--) In the cases that follow, we will examine how these classification schemes were developed and used in the various countries.
THE UNITED STATES
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976 is the formal legislation for controlling hazardous wastes in the United States. This legislation replaced the previous Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965 and placed more emphasis on "resource recovery" or the recycling of waste components such as glass, metal, aluminum, etc. Subtitle C of the Act focused on the control of hazardous waste, which at the time of its passage was viewed as the least significant section of the law. Coming nearly two years before the widely publicized Love Canal episode, government, industry, and environmental groups generally did not view the problem of hazardous wastes as a separate and distinct issue from the more general problem of handling and recycling solid industrial and municipal waste. Therefore, the Act was passed virtually unopposed by industry and unnoticed by environmental groups. Its passage, to a large extent, resulted from the efforts of a few individual Congressmen who felt that a law concerning solid wastes was the one unfinished piece of environmental protection legislation, after the passage in the U.S. of the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts in the early 1970's. Ironically, the EPA had little involvement in the preparation and passage of the legislation, yet it was later charged with the task of developing the regulatory system outlined in it.
[4]
Subtitle C of RCRA lays out a broad framework for the comprehensive control of hazardous wastes with five major elements:
1. a federal classification system;
2.
a trip ticket control system; Other wastes, that were not acutely toxic, were to be listed if they were carcinogenic, mutagenic, teratogenic, phytotoxic or toxic to aquatic species.
Using these characteristics, the EPA identified over 380 chemical substances that, if present in a waste, would make it hazardous, unless it could be shown that the waste was not hazardous after consideration of 11 factors. The factors included, for instance, the nature of the toxicity of the constituent, the concentration of the constituent in the waste, the quantity of waste generated, and "such other factors as may be appropriate." [8] As a result, the Administrator of the EPA had a large measure of discretion in deciding whether a waste must be listed or not. Although any of these 11 factors could be used to justify not listing a waste, the actual process was described by the EPA as follows. Industrial studies are continuing at the EPA and since the promulgation of the 1980 regulations some 10-12 additional wastes have been identified. According to one EPA staff member, the program can never hope to cover the dynamic universe of wastes produced. Indeed, some EPA staff members feel that the lists should be dispensed with and that the regulations should rely exclusively on the characteristic approach.
[13]
The final list of wastes promulgated by the EPA contained three sections.
Section 261.31 listed 13 hazardous wastes resulting from non-specific sources The quantity exclusion level for wastes listed as acutely hazardous was a limited attempt by the EPA to impose a degree of hazard system. Under the RCRA regulations, a hazardous waste is to be regulated only if a generator produces more than 1000 kilograms of the waste per month. However, those wastes listed as acutely hazardous (Section 261.33e) must be regulated if more than one kilogram per month is produced. By introducing this distinction the EPA recognized that some wastes are more dangerous than others and should be subject to tighter control. The EPA also considered rnore detailed degree of hazard classification systems including: (a) using a threshold quantity for hazardous constituents of a waste to determine if regulation is required, i.e., a concentration level for partcular constitutent that must be exceeded before the waste is considered hazardous; and (b) developing degree of hazard categories for particular wastes based on their characteristics. The EPA rejected these and other suggestions for degree of hazard systems because it felt that:
"given current knowledge and information these assessments cannot be made for most wastes with sufficient precision to determine the specific quantities which represent a threshold for finding a waste hazardous. The Agency must, therefore, consider all quantities of any waste listed as hazardous.
The detailed justification for listing each waste in the regulations were contained in background documents. The documents included:
1. A summary of the Administrator's basis for listing each waste.
A brief description of the specific industry; 3. A description of the manufacturing process; 4.
An identification of waste composition, constituent concentration; and annual quantity generated;
5.
A discussion of the basis for listing each waste stream;
6.
A summary of the diverse health effects of each of the constituents of concern.
[l5]
Despite this elaborate justification, the EPA admitted that decisions to list a waste were often based on qualitative judgments, generally involving expert assumptions rather than precise field rneasurement.
[l6]
The original waste list was subjected first to internal EPA review and then, according to U.S. administrative law, was published for public comment in 1978.
Although this procedure generated many comments from industry, the content of the list was not substantially revised: some 6 or 7 wastes were removed as a Finally, the regulations also provided a procedure by which any person can petition the Agency to have a listed' waste "delisted". This challenge can be based on: (a) the contention that the EPA reached an erroneous conclusion in its evaluation of the scientific grounds for listing, or (b) the assertion that the waste of the petitioner is different from the material on which the EPA focused in listing the waste as hazardous.
[l8] The first approach is significantly more difficult since it requires the petitioner to present scientific evidence rebutting the conclusions reached by the EPA, requiring extensive scientific
These EPA lists included all three types of inclusive lists explained in the second section of this paper, i.e., generic lists of wastes arising in many industries, industry specific waste streams, and a list of chemical products to be considered hazardous if discarded.
The Characteristic Approach
As outlined above, the EPA felt that its listing procedure would not comprehensively cover the entire range of hazardous wastes. To fill in the gap, the EPA decided to require generators to test their wastes, if they did not appear on the lists. to determine if they exhibit certain hazardous characteristics. The draft regulations originally proposed eight characteristics requiring testing, but these were reduced to four in the final regulations. They include:
ignitability -liquids with a flash point of less than 60 degrees centigrade and flammable solids or semi-solids; corrosivity -wastes that have a pH of 2 or less, or of 12.5 or more; or wastes that corrode steel at a rate greater than 6.35 mm per year; reactivity -wastes likely to cause acute or chronic adverse health effects in persons exposed; toxicity -wastes which cause acute or chronic adverse health effects in persons exposed.
The toxicity characteristic was by far the most controversial, mainly because the EPA encountered great dimculty in trying to develop testing procedures to measure toxicity.
[20] The EPA finally promulgated an Extraction Procedure
Test that specified the laboratory steps to be followed in analyzing representative samples of each waste for 14 contaminents listed in the U.S. National Drinking Water Standards. If these contaminents were present, in an aqueous leachate extracted from the waste, at levels 100 times or greater than the concentrations allowed in drinking water, then the waste is considered hazardous. 
Two Definitions
In Germany the term "special waste" is used rather than "hazardous waste". In the amendments to the Waste Act, two related, but somewhat different definitions of special wastes were given. The drst definition was a technical one defining certain wastes from industrial sources that:
"because of their nature, composition, or quantity are especially dangerous to health, air, or water quality, are explosive. flammable or could promote infectious diseases, and therefore special requirements for their control are necessary." [24] The second definition was an administrative one, stating that certa.in wastes:
"because of their nature and quantity should be excluded from disposal with household wastes." [25] In the negotiations between the federal goverrlment and the states that took place prior to the passage of the 1978 amendments, the terms "hazardous" and "special" were completely left out of the Act. The states felt that the term "hazardous" would cause unnecessary public alarm. The term "special" did not include the wastes covered by the second definition, which are really "excludable" wastes. In the end, both the words "special" and "hazardous" were left out. The term "special" is still used. but its meaning is somewhat ambiguous.
In general, "special wastes" are those referred to by the first definition above set out in Section 2, Paragraph 2 of the Waste Act.
[26] However, the term special is still used by some authorities to mean any waste excluded from disposal with household wastes. This confusion has yet to be cleared up. Efforts to do so are underway and are discussed below.
Section 2 Paragraph 2 of the Act as amended, required the government to define more exactly which wastes were covered by the act by issuing regulations. However, before these regulations were issued, there had been attempts to define the concept of "waste" in general. Berlin. The the committee was charged with making the concept of "special waste" more concrete. In order to do that, the committee decided to first organize categories of wastes into a coherent system, so that the sub-set of special wastes could be more easily defined. As the chairman of the committee put it, "The catalog was really a by-product of our main objective; however, it has proven to be the more lasting contribution." [30] The basis of the catalog was a comprehensive survey of waste producers in Over 600 individual waste types were listed.
LAGA and the Waste Catalog
[31]
From this list of wastes, the LAGA group developed a smaller inclusive list of "special wastes" which in their opinion required special handling and disposal. This special waste list served as the basis for individual state regulations.
These efforts were soon overshadowed, however, by a federal initiative to adopt a list of special wastes on the basis of the 1976 amendments to the Waste Act.
The Federal Regulations
In the 1976 amendments to the 1972 Waste Act, the definition of special wastes (without calling them that) in Section 2, Paragraph 2, also authorized the government to issue regulations listing wastes that were to be included in the trip-ticket control system. These regulations, listing some 86 waste types were promulgated on May 24, 1977.
The preparatory work for these regulations began at the UBA in Berlin, when the Minister of the Interior asked the UBA to develop a set of draft regulations. The in-house experts at the UBA were forced from the beginning to choose between two strategies. They could either develop an inclusive waste list based on the LAGA catalog, or put together a list of toxic constituents which, if present in a waste, would subject the waste to regulation. They also considered fixing concentration levels for these hazardous constituents in order for a waste to be controlled by the system. In the end they decided to stay with the system developed by LAGA for a number of reasons: Scientific analysis was not advanced enough to make the testing of concentration levels In listing the sources in Column 3, the UBA listed only those industries, or production processes that they thought would produce significant quantities of the listed waste. So a waste comes under the regulations if it is listed in columns 1 and 2, and is produced by one of the industries or as a result of one of the processes listed in column 3. The same waste, produced by an industry not given in column 3 is not covered by the federal regulations. [35] In contrast to the EPA in the U.S., the UBA relied only on the listing method for classifying hazardous wastes. It did not adopt the characteristics approach for identifying hazardous wastes not covered by the lists. They felt that the scientific analyses required for testing waste characteristics were both difficult to standardize and would place unacceptable cost burdens on industry.
The listing of the hazardous constituents was considered, but for the previously mentioned reasons, rejected.
State Lists -Bavaria and Hesse
In addition to the 86 wastes that must be controlled under the federal regulations, state environmental authorities were free to require trip-tickets and other controls for additional wastes. The two German states that became most actively involved in hazardous waste regulation were Bavaria and Hesse.
Their waste lists make an interesting comparison to the federal one.
Bavaria had developed, before the federal regulation, its own waste list. This list was also based on the LAGA catalog but included quantity cut-ofls for four classes of waste. For each category, there was a minimum amount that had to be produced in order to trigger regulation. These regulations had to be scrapped, however, when the federal regulations were adopted since they did not match the federal system. Bavarian authorities expressed frustration at having developed its system too early and then being forced to change it at considerable cost. 
AUSTRIA
Austria began relatively late to develop a hazardous waste control system.
As in other industrialized countries, several well-publicized scandals concerning illegal dumping and poor management of wastes spurred regulatory action.
Austria passed its Special Waste Act to deal with the problem on March 2, 1983, and it went into effect on January 1, 1984. When the Austrian authorities had to identify wastes to be controlled, they took advantage of their late start to observe the experiences of other countries. However, the mechanism by which they developed their waste list is unique in the way cooperation between industry andgovernment was carried out.
The task of developing a waste list in Austria was given to the Oesterreich- To produce this list of hazardous special wastes the special waste working group of FNA-157 expanded its membership to a record 120. The majority of the members were industry representatives from trade associations and firms, but also included federal, state, and local government officials and a few scientific experts from universities.
Because of the unique interest in the issue, the FNA decided in this case to allow any industry representative who asked to participate (usually only selected representatives are chosen by the FNA). However, certain environmentalists who asked to participate were excluded, namely a group called "Critical Chemistry". The FNA voted not to allow this group to participate with the reason that "there were already enough chemists on the committee." [45] It also decided, in a change of the rules, to allow the entire working group and the members of the FNA to vote on the final list of wastes. The working group formed a smaller sub-group of 15 members to make an initial selection of wastes for the list. They began by listing those wastes in the special waste catalog that were designated as requiring the most stringent disposal methods.
They also examined the hazardous wastes list of other countries, most notably the FRG and Switzerland. Their draft list contained some 160 wastes, which was then reduced in a negotiation process within the full working group.
Interestingly, the rules of the Standard Tnstitute required that working groups reach decisions unanimously. A member of the group told us that the representatives from particular industries protested the inclusion of their wastes on the list, and they theoretically could have vetoed any decision. But there was strong pressure to compromise, because the Ministry of Health and Environment could always take over the process if agreement was not reached.
He claimed they were most often persuaded by health effects arguments made by the scientific experts. In addition, the earlier classification system developed for the special waste catalog, put together with the help of industry representatives, gave clear guidelines for which wastes to include. It was very difficult for industry representatives, who had accepted that catalog, to argue for changes in its principles. [46] Finally a compromise list of 148 wastes was agreed upon and published by the Standard Institute for public comment. About 25 objections were submitted, reviewed by the FNA, and rejected. The list was published in ha1 form on December 1, 1903.[47] It was agreed in the F'NA to call these wastes "special wastes requiring supervision," rather than hazardous special wastes because, as in the FRG, they wanted to avoid public alarm. On February 9, 1904. the Ministry of Health and Environment issued regulations that declared the list binding and introduced a trip-ticket system for all of the listed wastes. The regulations also introduced quantity production cut-off levels similar to those in the U.S.
For nine waste types, the wastes are regulated if more than 20 kilograms per year (kg/year) are produced. For all other wastes listed, 200 kg/year must be produced before regulation is required. [48] In summary, the Austrian system like that of FRG, relies on an inclusive hazardous waste list and does not include characteristics or constituent approaches. It does, however, use quantity cut-offs in an informal degree of hazard system as in the U.S., and makes recommendations as to the appropriate d_lsposal method, similar to Hesse's three category list. The most interesting aspect of Austria's list is the process by which it has developed, especially the degree of industry participation in the process. We will now discuss this issue and others in more detail.
THE INST?TUTIONAL FTbWtNG OF HAZARD
The case studies of the development of hazardous waste classification systems in the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Austria illustrate how both science and institutional needs shaped the regulatory programs that were constructed. In addition to the scientific uncertainty surrounding delinitions and classification systems for hazardous waste, the rules adopted in each country. and therefore the outcomes of an apparently scientific problem, ultimately reflect political and legal frameworks, the objectives of each country, and explain the difficulties encountered by international organizations attempting to develop standardized classification systems.
Dealing with Scientific Uncertainty
In developing hazardous waste classification systems, science is constrained and shaped by institutional needs. One of the most important constraints in hazardous waste control is that the scientific information concerning the hazards associated with these wastes is either uncertain, unknown, or unknowable (for a further discussion see in this volume Wynne p.--). The role of science is illustrated by the deliberations over using degree of hazard systems for classifying wastes. Both the FRG and the U.S. have seriously considered. but decided against, developing complicated degrees of hazard systems for their regulatory control programs, including establishing concentration levels for hazardous constituents in a waste that must be exceeded before it is regulated. Few dispute the theoretical advantages of classifying wastes by different levels of risks so that the control systems could be designed and resources allocated accordingly.
Unfortunately, the information needed For such classification is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. The "hazard" of waste depends on a variety of factors including physical form, composition, concentration of constituents, toxicity of constituents, method of disposal, etc. All of these factors are difficult to measure and standardize in some form of classification system. Toxicity testing, for example, is filled with uncertainty concerning dose-response relationships, extrapolating animal models to humans, and the lack of standardized testing procedures. "...even in the United States with its enormous scientific, technical, and financial resources--no more than 500 chemicals can be tested each year because of the limited availability of trained toxicologists, laboratory facilities, and test animals. This is barely sufficient to keep up with the flow of new chemicals, let alone to investigate the existing stock of well over 50,000 chemicals in commercial use. International cooperation in toxicological testing would have obvious benefits; but serious (if ill-understood) differences in methodology, risk philosophies, and regulatory approaches make cooperation difficult, and even reduce the value of the limited amount of information that is available." [53] It should be mentioned that the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has been relatively successful in developing international protocols for toxic goods. Wastes, however, are much more dimcult to test because of their heterogeneous nature. Hazardous goods are often tested by procedures to ensure quality control, but there is little incentive for such testing of wastes.
Political Objectives
Because of the inherent scientific uncertainties involved in hazardous waste classification, it is not surprising that the process used and the outcomes achieved reflected the political and social goals of the regulators. In the United
States, the original goals of the RCRA program were to control all hazardous wastes generated in the U.S. This comprehensive system was clearly mandated by Congress because it felt that a uniform system was necessary in order to ensure that some states would not become "dumping grounds" for others.
[54]
Later, as the EPA began to develop its regulations, the legal and economic constraints of a total control system began to be recognized and compromises in the philosophy of total control were introduced, such as the procedure for delisting wastes and the exclusion of small quantity generators from the regulations.
In the FRG, the purpose of federal regulation was not to develop national all-inclusive standards. As with other types of regulation, the responsibility for implementing hazardous waste control was handed to the states. Federal regulations identified only those wastes that needed to be controlled in every state but the states were allowed to develop and greatly expand their own classification systems. The decision not to adopt a constituent list approach in the federal regulations was also based in part on the fact that state governments had already developed their systems from the LAGA catalog. This deference to state authority and the traditional role of the UBA as a technical advisor, not as regulator and supervisor (the role of the EPA in the U.S.), is reflected in the hazardous waste control system that was developed. The disadvantages of the system. namely that decentralized control can lead to'wide disparities between the different state regulations and make cross-border transport more difficult, has now led to pressure for a more centralized classiflcation system and standards.
Finally, in Austria, the implementation of the system was thought to be impossible without the consent and cooperation of industry. The traditional spirit of social partnership, holds that all social and economic problems can be dealt with through negotiation and cooperation between government, industry, and labor unions. [55] This belief led to a process that from the beginning involved both industry and government in developing a compromise list of wastes, with the explicit recognition that the definition hazard was politically constructed (whether wastes were to be included was voted on).
Scientfic Justification
In addition to the different political goals that influenced the process of hazard classification in the countries studied, there were differences in the amount and kind of scientific evidence presented to support the inclusion of certain wastes on the lists. In the U.S. each individual waste was supported by a background document giving detailed justification for the listing of a particular waste. Such detail is supplied in part as a precaution against future legal chal- In contrast. U.S. approaches to environmental regulation have been much more adversarial in nature, reflecting a need to force industry to comply with rules protecting the public health and the environment. Even when the agencies were reluctant to take on such adversarial roles, they were often compelled to do so by pressure from public interest groups and/or judicial action.
Political Legitimacy
These differences in the handling of scientific uncertainty, political goals, and scientific justification all reflect cultural differences inherent in the approaches chosen by the different regulatory agencies trying to legitimate their actions. In the U.S., the regulatory philosophy that guided the develop ment of the hazardous waste regulations was adversarial and characterized by centralized expertise and control. Interest groups were only allowed to comment on published draft regulations, not participate in their development. In the FRG, expertise and control was more decentralized, with regulatory responsibility in the states and the federal agencies mainly playing an advisory role.
Consensus on regulatory objectives was sought, through the LAG& between levels of government, not between government and interest groups. Discussions with interest groups were held often after regulatory strategies were chosen.
but before regulations were finalized and published. At the other extreme, These differences in regulatory practice explain, to a large extent, the difficulty in developing international hazardous waste classification systems.
However, some limited consensus has been achieved. The European Economic
Community has issued a Directive on Toxic and Dungerous Wastes that lists 27 waste categories to be regulated by the member nations. A NATO study identified 38 waste types that were regulated in three or more NATO countries. [61] Work is underway at the OECD in Paris to develop a means of crossreferencing a waste listed in one country to the list of another.
[62] But this basic consensus has not led to standardization because the systems operating in the various countries must be more detailed and reflect fundamental political, social, and cultural differences.
CONCLUSIONS
The case studies clearly show that what appears a straightforward scientific exercise, namely the definition and classification hazardous wastes, is not straightforward at all. Rather, the definition of hazard ultimately depends on the political and institutional framework and objectives for which the definition is being developed. Scientific information, characterized by large uncertainties, can legitimately be molded to fit other needs. This analysis suggests that more attention must be given to defining the realistic goals of hazardous waste definition and classification in light of institutional and political constraints so that these goals can have a reasonable chance of being achieved.
